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Overview—After briefly describing the federal legal
framework that has fostered the growth of binding
arbitration, this paper identifies controversies that have
developed over arbitration as well as arguments support-
ing and opposing its use. In attempting to gauge the
prevalence of the use of arbitration to resolve disputes
between health plans and individuals, the paper then
describes its use among certain types of collectively
bargained employee health plans regulated under the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974
(ERISA), by health maintenance organizations (HMOs)
in California, and by a large employer operating a self-
insured ERISA health plan. Next, the paper examines
evidence cited by the California Supreme Court that the
largest HMO in California operated its mandatory
arbitration program in an unfair way. The HMO’s
subsequent efforts to identify problems with its arbitration
program and correct them are presented. Proposals
introduced in the California legislature to further regu-
late arbitration or to ban predispute arbitration agree-
ments with health plans are described as well as their
possible preemption by federal law. The paper presents
a protocol developed by leading associations involved in
alternative dispute resolution, law, and medicine recom-
mending that binding forms of arbitration involving
disputes between individuals and private health plans
should be used only after disputes arise. After describing
the treatment of arbitration by proposed laws and regula-
tions currently under consideration by Congress and the
U.S. Department of Labor (DOL) for employee health
plans, the paper concludes by raising some of the issues
that arbitration presents for federal policymakers.
As Congress considers bolstering the administrative
and legal remedies available to private-sector employee
health plan participants for resolving coverage disputes,
the attractiveness of alternatives to litigation may grow.
Employers and unions sponsoring health plans as well
as managed care organizations (MCOs) already use
alternative dispute resolution (ADR) methods such as
mediation and binding arbitration in a variety of con-
texts. These methods of resolving disputes might take
on new gloss if health plan sponsors, administrators,
and medical providers faced increased risk of lawsuits
and damage awards. Although ADR methods are often
touted as a more efficient means of coming to settle-
ment than going to court, they raise several policy
issues, particularly concerning the use of binding
arbitration to resolve disputes between patients and
group health plans, insurance companies, and managed
care organizations. The issues are perhaps thorniest in
instances where employers and/or unions arranging
group health coverage sign binding arbitration agree-
ments waiving an individual’s right to statutory reme-
dies that otherwise would be available should a dispute
arise. Binding arbitration is currently used to resolve
disputes, including those over coverage issues involving
participants in health plans governed by ERISA,1 the
plans themselves, and MCOs contracting with them.
Some critics question whether pre-dispute binding
arbitration agreements should ever be allowed between
individuals and health plans while others argue that,
where arbitration is allowed, it should be more heavily
regulated and monitored.
Generally speaking, federal law allows parties to
waive their rights to go to court to resolve disputes
arising from a contract and instead to use alternative
means, including binding arbitration, which in essence
is a privately administered justice system whose rulings
are enforceable in the courts. Arbitration is an ad-
versarial process that can take many forms. It can be
binding or nonbinding. Arbitration agreements can be
made either before or after a dispute arises. As noted
above, arbitration is one of several types of ADR
methods that in some instances may be a more efficient
way of resolving disputes than going to court. Another
prominent form of ADR is mediation. Mediation is
fundamentally different from arbitration. It is a volun-
tary process in which a neutral party facilitates the
negotiation of an agreement by the disputing parties
themselves. Arbitrators, in contrast, make rulings, often
without a written rationale.
THE REACH OF THE FEDERAL
ARBITRATION ACT
Federal law has created an increasingly friendly
environment for arbitration agreements and, in recent
years, has helped to fuel controversy over misuses of
arbitration. In a 1991 ruling, Supreme Court Justice
Byron R.White declared that the Federal Arbitration Act
(FAA), originally enacted by Congress in 1925, was
intended “to reverse the longstanding judicial hostility
to arbitration agreements that had existed at English
common law and had been adopted by American courts,
and to place arbitration agreements upon the same
footing as other contracts.”2 Furthermore, he said, the
FAA’s provisions manifest a “liberal federal policy
favoring arbitration agreements.” When the FAA was
enacted, arbitration was used primarily in commercial
settings to resolve disputes between businesspeople with
similar bargaining power. Over the years, the use of
arbitration has expanded dramatically, in part because of
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the Supreme Court’s expansive interpretation of both
the FAA’s scope and its preemption of state law. Ac-
cording to one legal analyst:
Arbitration today . . . is not limited to the commercial
context. Indeed, provisions providing for the arbitration
of disputes can be found in a variety of contracts, many
of which are adhesion contracts.3 Predispute arbitration
clauses can be found in contracts between investors and
broker-dealers, employment contracts, franchise agree-
ments, health care contracts, and in a whole array of
other consumer contracts. . . . Arbitration provisions
have been upheld in cases involving breach of contract
claims to cases involving violation of statutory rights,
including rights based on federal securities laws,
antitrust laws, and antidiscrimination laws.4
The growth of arbitration agreements and their deploy-
ment in contracts formed by parties with unequal bar-
gaining power or information have arguably increased
suspicion and resistance to the use of arbitration.
The broad scope of the FAA, combined with the
Supreme Court’s interpretation of its preemption of
state law, has greatly restricted the ability of states to
regulate arbitration agreements and has led to increas-
ing frustration among state courts and legislatures
seeking to protect citizens from uses of arbitration they
perceive to be unfair or abusive.5 In Doctor’s Associ-
ates, Inc., v. Casarotto,6 the Supreme Court in 1996
ruled that state laws that singled out arbitration agree-
ments in order to limit their validity were preempted by
federal law and that, in order to avoid preemption, a
state law would have to limit or regulate contracts
generally and not specify arbitration agreements.
Reversing a decision by the Montana Supreme Court,
the Court held that a Montana law mandating conspicu-
ous notice of a predispute arbitration clause in a con-
tract was preempted by the FAA. State contract law
governs the question of whether a particular arbitration
provision is valid and state courts may apply generally
applicable contract laws to find an arbitration agreement
to be invalid, such as on the grounds on unconscion-
ability.7 To determine whether a contract is unconsciona-
ble, courts examine whether contract provisions favor the
drafter and whether a weaker party has any meaningful
choice in accepting the terms, as well as factors such as
unequal bargaining power, oppression, exploitation, or
lack of sophistication.
Almost all states have enacted laws that are generally
favorable to arbitration and many of these are modeled
after the Uniform Arbitration Act, which was developed
in the 1950s.8 Notwithstanding the Supreme Court’s 1996
dictum on preemption of statutes limiting arbitration,
many states also have laws on the books that limit the use
of arbitration and at least two regulate binding arbitration
through statute9 (see Table 1 on page 4).
While the FAA has facilitated the use of arbitration in
a wide variety of settings and for many types of issues, in
recent years the reach of the law has been challenged on
several fronts. One area of contention is whether the FAA
can be used to compel arbitration of claims brought under
other federal statutes, such as antidiscrimination laws.
Some have argued that the FAA was intended to apply
primarily to arbitration agreements made in commercial
contracts and that arbitration should not be used to
substitute for statutory procedural rights. In 1991, how-
ever, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that claims brought
under a federal statute (in this instance a claim under the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967) may be
the subject of an arbitration agreement and enforceable
pursuant to the  FAA.10 In this case (Gilmer v. Inter-
state/Johnson Lane Corp.), as a condition of employment,
Robert Gilmer had to register as a securities representa-
tive with several stock exchanges, including the New
York Stock Exchange. In order to get the job, Gilmer had
to sign an agreement that any dispute arising between him
and his employer would be required to be arbitrated under
the “rules, constitutions, or by-laws” of the organizations
with which he had to register. After Interstate terminated
his employment when he reached 62 years of age, Gilmer
sought to pursue an age discrimination claim in court.
Interstate filed a motion to compel arbitration of the
discrimination claim.
Four federal circuit courts have held that Congress did
not intend to prohibit arbitration of statutory claims
arising under ERISA.11 Earlier this year, for example, the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit upheld the
arbitrability of claims that trustees of a corporate profit-
sharing plan had breached their fiduciary duties under
ERISA by purposefully undervaluing the price at which
plan participants’ stock was sold.12
Another important area of controversy is whether the
FAA applies to employment or labor contracts at all. The
Supreme Court has agreed to review a decision by U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit (Circuit City
Stores v. Adams)13 that the FAA does not apply to labor or
employment contracts. If it agrees with the ninth circuit
court decision, the Supreme Court could dramatically
constrict the use of arbitration in the employment and
labor field. In Circuit City, the ninth circuit court, which
covers the far western states, reiterated its recent conclu-
sion in Craft v. Campbell Soup Co.14 In that case, a
Campbell Soup employee named Anthony Craft was a
member of the Food Process Workers and Warehouse-
men and Helpers Union. The collective bargaining
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Table 1
State Statutes Limiting Use of Arbitration
Statutory Provisions States
Prohibit use of binding arbitration for malpractice South Dakota, South Carolina
Exclude personal injury and tort actions from general
arbitration statutes
Arkansas, Iowa, Kansas, Montana, Nebraska, South
Carolina, Texas
Exclude contracts of adhesion from general arbitration
statutes
Iowa, Missouri, Nebraska
Exclude contracts of insurance from general arbitration
statutes
Arkansas, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Missouri, Montana,
Nebraska, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Texas, Vermont
Regulate binding arbitration through statute Illinois, Michigan
Source: California Research Bureau, California State Library, 2000.
agreement (CBA) between the company and the union
included a nondiscrimination clause providing that
“disputes under this provision shall be subject to the
grievance and arbitration procedure” provided in the
CBA. Craft filed a grievance alleging racial discrimina-
tion, harassment, health and safety concerns, and other
claims. The grievance was not resolved in the initial
stages and the union referred it to arbitration. While the
grievance was still pending, Craft took his case to court.
The ninth circuit court reexamined the employment
exclusion clause in FAA, which other courts have found
to allow the arbitration of employment contracts, along
with the act’s legislative history, and concurred with the
dissenting opinion in Gilmer that the FAA does not apply
to labor and employment contracts. According the ninth
circuit court, the legislative history of the act indicates that
the FAA was part of an effort to gain uniformity in the
application of agreements to arbitrate sales and commer-
cial transactions. The FAA was never intended to apply
to labor contracts of any sort. Labor contracts were seen
as having the potential to elicit the forced agreement to
arbitrate that the enactors of the FAA so disliked.
The Supreme Court also has agreed to review a ruling
by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 11th Circuit that
steep filing fees, arbitrators’ costs, and other arbitration
expenses may render an arbitration agreement unenforce-
able if they curtail a person’s access to an arbitral forum
serving as an alternative to a judicial forum available to
vindicate statutory rights.15 In this case, Randolph v.
Green Tree, a woman who had bought a mobile home
sought to sue the financing company on grounds that it
had violated the federal Truth in Lending Act by failing to
disclose that she had to pay for an insurance policy to
cover any repossession expenses.16 She wanted to sue the
company as part of a class-action suit but the mandatory
arbitration clause prevented her from doing so. The 11th
circuit court concluded that the arbitration clause was
unenforceable because it failed to provide minimum
guarantees that she could access her rights under the act.
GENERAL CONCERN ABOUT
ARBITRATION
In recent years, the use of binding arbitration has come
under fire in several fields, including health care, employ-
ment, and financial services. On March 1, 2000, for
example, the U.S. Senate Committee on the Judiciary’s
Subcommittee on Administrative Oversight and the
Courts held a hearing that probed the fairness of the
growing number of contracts requiring employees,
businesses, and consumers to give up their rights to sue
and submit all future claims to arbitration. While subcom-
mittee chairman Charles E. Grassley (R-Iowa) has said
that he supports arbitration as a way of unclogging an
overburdened court system, he also wants to make sure
consumer interests are protected and that arbitration
hearings are being conducted in a fair way.17 Legislation
has been introduced in the House that would ban manda-
tory arbitration provisions in consumer contracts.
While many financial services providers argue that
arbitration helps consumers by giving them speedy
resolution and greater access to dispute resolution than
going to court, critics charge that many arbitration pro-
grams are tilted in one direction. For example, data
disclosed recently in a class-action lawsuit against First
USA N.A., the nation’s second-largest issuer of credit
cards, show that the company won 99.6 percent of the
cases that went all the way to the arbitrator.
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Merits Debated
In general, supporters of arbitration argue that a
properly administered program may give consumers
greater access and speedier results than the often-overbur-
dened court system. Others dispute this and point out that
in many instances arbitration programs are unfairly tilted
toward the party with the most power—for example, the
employer in some employment cases or the employer,
union, or MCO in health coverage or medical malpractice
disputes. Opponents of arbitration note that firms that
supply neutral arbitrators and the arbitrators themselves
are more likely to develop ties to large organizations that
use and pay for their services on a regular basis than to
individuals who will use their services rarely, if ever.
There is evidence that some arbitration programs have
been patently unfair to consumers and—through fraud,
procedural impediments, or high costs—may bar their
access to resolving disputes. Other criticisms of arbitra-
tion include that individuals lose appeal rights and,
therefore, the ability to correct mistaken decisions18 and
that there is typically no public record or precedential
value of an arbitrator’s ruling. Supporters of arbitration
might argue that the confidentiality of the arbitration
process is an asset. According to one commentator, ADR
for managed health care is particularly appropriate in
situations requiring unique, confidential, and non-
precedential decisions.19
In part because there generally is no record of arbitra-
tors’ decisions, little systematic research has been con-
ducted on the effects of arbitration, including whether
arbitrators’ decisions are skewed in a particular way.
Little is known, too, about whether the types of cases that
go to arbitration differ in important ways from cases that
go to court. In a structural sense, arbitration is dependent
on the judicial system; arbitrators must reference court
rulings in order to make decisions and set award amounts.
Arguably, if arbitration became the norm and not the
exception, the ability of the law to evolve through judicial
interpretation might become impaired.
USE OF ARBITRATION BY
HEALTH PLANS
While there is no definitive research on how widely
binding arbitration and other forms of ADR are used to
resolve health-care-related disputes involving patients and
health plan participants, there is evidence that its use has
grown robustly in some areas of the country. For example,
it is used by many MCOs in California. Kaiser Perma-
nente, the state’s largest HMO, includes binding arbitra-
tion agreements in both its individual and group contracts
and uses arbitration primarily to resolve medical malprac-
tice claims. In part because of increasing numbers of
disputes over provider payment and health plan coverage
issues, providers of ADR services have begun recruiting
and training more health professionals. In addition, as
described in more detail below, binding arbitration is
widely used in resolving disputes over collectively
bargained employee benefits. It also is used by some large
employers to resolve employment and benefit disputes.
California HMOs
California has been a particularly fertile ground for the
use of binding arbitration by managed care organizations.
A recent study by researchers at RAND found that most
of the state’s HMOs incorporated arbitration agreements
in contracts with purchasers and enrollees (but preferred
provider organizations did not).20 Most of the HMOs
designed the agreements to apply only to contract disputes
and not to medical liability claims. Despite this, the
number of health coverage disputes going to arbitration
appears to be extremely small and those disputes that are
arbitrated are almost exclusively medical malpractice
cases. Of the 20 California HMOs that reported using the
agreements with enrollees, 8 (Kaiser Permanente,
CIGNA, and 6 very small plans) applied them to both
contractual and medical malpractice disputes. The RAND
study also found that about 9 percent of hospitals (respon-
sible for about 20 percent of statewide hospital admis-
sions) and 9 percent of physicians surveyed used binding
arbitration agreements.
Although most HMO contracts included binding
arbitration agreements, they are generally not invoked to
resolve coverage disputes because federal laws regulating
private-sector employee benefits and overseeing Medi-
care have eliminated the threat of costly litigation as an
alternative. Medicare has established a mandatory appeals
process for coverage denials by HMOs. ERISA, which
governs most private-sector employee health plans,
permits plan participants to seek recovery of denied
benefits in a federal court but bars them from suing under
state laws for injuries or wrongful death resulting from
denials of coverage. Plan participants often find it difficult
to appeal coverage denials and very few cases go to court.
MCOs might be more prone to exercise the binding
arbitration agreements already in place if they faced an
increased threat of costly lawsuits—a scenario that might
occur if patient protection legislation passed by the U.S.
House of Representatives last year became law or if
Congress opted to expand ERISA’s court remedies to
allow people to sue for damages.21 Several states recently
have passed laws specifically allowing patients to sue
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health plans for injuries caused by coverage denials, but
these laws do not apply to ERISA plans and other plans
shielded from state law by federal preemption.
Although very few coverage disputes enter a formal
appeals process and end up in court, consumer surveys
have detected that a significant number of people report
problems with treatment delays and coverage denials. A
survey by the California Association of HMOs found
that health plans responding reported an annual average
of only four coverage disputes per one million enrollees
(as contrasted with an annual average of 102 claims per
one million enrollees for medical malpractice disputes
for Kaiser and CIGNA).22 On the other hand, a recent
survey by the Kaiser Family Foundation found that,
while most people are basically satisfied with their
health insurance plans and report positive experiences,
a majority of consumers also reported having had a
problem with their health plan over the past year.23 The
most common types of problems reported involved
delays or denials of coverage or care (reported by 17
percent of all people and 32 percent of people with
problems), difficulty seeing a physician (14 percent of
all people, 27 percent of people with problems), and
billing and payment problems (12 percent of all people,
23 percent of people with problems).
Collectively Bargained Health Benefits
Labor unions and employers usually agree to resolve
disputes over interpreting or applying a collective bar-
gaining agreement through binding arbitration. The use of
arbitration to resolve health benefit coverage disputes in
collectively bargained health plans presents a complex set
of issues in part because of the interaction of ERISA with
labor law. It is open to question whether employers and/or
unions may prevent arbitrated claims from then being
appealed to the courts in many instances. One of the
reasons for this is that ERISA provides plan participants
and beneficiaries with statutory rights to appeal benefit
denials and subsequently to go to court to reverse denied
appeals. Depending on the case, collectively bargained
benefit claims may be characterized as demands for
enforcement of a collective bargaining agreement (to be
resolved through binding arbitration), as claims for a
benefit promised under ERISA’s statutory remedial
scheme, or as both types of claims. It has been asserted
that the uncertainty surrounding how final and “binding”
arbitration rulings might be in this context may subject
employers to a form of double jeopardy.24 By the same
token, from a plan participant’s perspective, the use of an
arbitration process agreed to in collective bargaining
might arguably deprive him or her of statutory appeal
rights available to other types of employees protected
under ERISA.
ERISA does not address whether or under what terms
arbitration might be used to resolve disputes or to displace
legal remedies available to health plan participants.25
Department of Labor regulations, however, explicitly
allow the use of binding arbitration under ERISA to
resolve disputes over benefit claims in single-employer
collectively bargained employee benefit plans, which
provide health coverage for millions of Americans.26
Current regulations also prohibit the use of procedures
that unduly inhibit or hamper the initiation or processing
of plan claims, including requiring claimants to pay a fee
or costs in order to make or appeal a claim. As noted
below, DOL has published proposed regulations that
would preclude plans from requiring claimants to submit
to binding arbitration either as part of the claims appeal
process or subsequently. As this paper went to press,
President Clinton had just ordered Secretary of Labor
Alexis Herman to release the new claims appeals regula-
tions. Other than in these regulations (one in force and the
other about to be), the Labor Department has not articu-
lated policy on whether and how arbitration might be used
to resolve disputes involving ERISA health plan partici-
pants. To what degree arbitration might be allowed under
other circumstances under ERISA remains an unsettled
question. As noted above, four federal circuit courts have
held that Congress did not intend to prohibit arbitration of
statutory ERISA claims.
ERISA sets out minimum requirements for administra-
tive procedures to resolve disputed employee benefit
claims in Section 503 and the legal remedies available to
participants once those administrative procedures are
exhausted in Section 502. Current DOL regulations
generally require that every ERISA-governed employee
benefit plan meet these minimum procedural standards
but also stipulate that collective bargaining agreements
establishing single-employer plans may substitute their
own claims appeals process for the Section 503 require-
ments, including “a grievance and arbitration procedure
to which denied claims are subject.”27 This exception to
ERISA’s claims regulations does not apply to multi-
employer union plans jointly administered by trustees
representing labor and management (these are often called
“Taft-Hartley” plans). One reason that the exception to
ERISA’s claims process may have been granted only to
single-employer collectively bargained plans (as opposed
to those under the control of multiemployer trusts) is that
unions arguably may be better positioned to advocate on
behalf of employees with denied claims in this setting.
Unions typically do not share responsibility for operating
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single-employer collectively bargained plans; however,
because they do take joint responsibility for operating
multiemployer plans, unions may be more likely to have
a conflict of interest (because they not only would be
negotiating the terms of the plan along with the methods
for resolving disputed claims but also would be responsi-
ble for the prudent management of the plan’s assets and
interpreting plan terms). (In general, collectively bar-
gained health benefits are provided either by an employer
or by the jointly trusteed funds to which employers
contribute. The health benefits may be purchased directly
or under contracts with insurers or MCOs.)
Employer-Sponsored Plans
Although the use of binding arbitration does not
appear to be widespread among employer-sponsored
health plans, instances of its use can be found. At least
one large employer, Halliburton, has enthusiastically
adopted an ADR program, including binding arbitration,
that is designed to resolve most disputes relating to
employees, including those over denied health benefit
claims.
About ten years ago, the Houston-based energy
services company formalized its appeals process for
employee benefit disputes and instituted a process ending
with binding arbitration.28 The company’s self-insured
ERISA health plan covers about 75,000 people in the
United States. Halliburton has since expanded the conflict
resolution program to cover most disputes involving
employees, and the vast majority of cases now concern
employment issues.
The company’s dispute resolution program creates a
multilevel process beginning with informal negotiation
among disputants, then proceeding to mediation and
arbitration. Of the almost 5,000 disputes that have been
handled under the program over the past decade, about
125 to 150 have ended up going to arbitration; media-
tions occur about six times as frequently as arbitrations.
Before the arbitration program was adopted, the com-
pany faced about half a dozen employee-benefits-related
lawsuits a year. Subsequently, the incidence of litigation
dropped to almost zero.
After being handled initially by outside contractors
administering the health plan, claims for denied health
benefits are appealed to the company’s vice president of
human resources and then to a benefits committee before
going to arbitration. According to company officials,
disputes over medical necessity rarely go to arbitration.
Most of the larger health-related cases that have gone to
arbitration are claims by unpaid providers. For example,
one case involved a $350,000 claim by a hospital for
providing services to a plan participant who had died. The
plan had denied payment for the services on grounds that
they were not covered because the plan participant had a
preexisting condition. The company ended up settling the
case for about $150,000. Halliburton draws arbitrators
from three organizations that administer conflict resolu-
tion programs on a national basis and absorbs the cost of
the arbitrations, except for a $50 fee.
EVIDENCE OF SYSTEMIC UNFAIRNESS:
KAISER V. ENGALLA
Evidence emerged in a widely cited California medical
malpractice lawsuit that Kaiser Permanente, perhaps the
largest user of binding arbitration among MCOs, may
have misused its arbitration program to defraud consum-
ers for many years. The lawsuit was filed by the estate of
Wilfredo Engalla against the Permanente Medical Group
and the Kaiser Foundation Health Plan after the HMO
engaged in stalling tactics to delay a mandatory arbitration
process. In 1997, the California Supreme Court found
evidence to support the claim that Kaiser had waived its
right to compel arbitration by causing unreasonable or bad
faith delays in the choice of arbitrators. The court’s
majority opinion stated,
We conclude that there is indeed evidence to support the
trial court’s findings that Kaiser engaged in fraudulent
conduct justifying a denial of its petition to compel
arbitration, but we further conclude that questions of
fact remain to be resolved by the trial court before it can
be determined whether Kaiser’s conduct was actually
fraudulent.29
The court noted, however, that Kaiser’s arbitration
agreement, per se, was not “unconscionable.” In other
words, the problem lay with the program’s administration,
not its contractual nature, according to the court.
Wilfredo Engalla’s lung cancer was detected in 1991
after he had manifested symptoms for many years.
Engalla and members of his family served on Kaiser a
demand for arbitration of their claims that the health
plan had been negligent in failing to detect the disease
sooner. According to the court, the Engallas’ attorney
correctly believed that his clients were required to file
for arbitration pursuant to the service agreement that
Kaiser had signed with Engalla’s employer, the Oliver
Tire and Rubber Company. Kaiser presented such an
arbitration agreement routinely to both individual
purchasers and employers purchasing health coverage
for employees. Under the agreement, if a claim were
filed, three arbitrators were supposed to be selected
within a relatively short time frame to deal with it. The
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court noted that Engalla and other Kaiser patients were
not aware that Kaiser’s arbitration program was being
administered by attorneys that were also retained to
defend the health plan in an adversarial capacity.
Engalla’s employer’s representative had read the pro-
visions of the arbitration agreement and believed that
the process would be fair to both employees and Kaiser,
according to the court. Kaiser represented that the
appointment of a neutral arbitrator would take a few
months time and would take a fair approach to protect-
ing participants’ rights.
Under the process, each side was supposed to
appoint one party arbitrator; these two individuals in
turn would jointly appoint a neutral arbitrator to rule on
the claim. Instead of acting promptly as promised, the
administrators of Kaiser’s arbitration program delayed
appointing an arbitrator. When Engalla died—145 days
after the initial service of his claim—the neutral arbitra-
tor still had not been appointed.
An independent analysis cited by the court showed
that, between 1984 and 1986, in only 1 percent of all
Kaiser cases was a neutral arbitrator appointed within
the 60-day period provided in the arbitration agreement.
Furthermore, on average it took 674 days to appoint
neutral arbitrators and 863 days to reach a hearing.
Delaying the arbitration reduced Kaiser’s potential
financial exposure in the Engalla case. For one thing,
under California malpractice laws, Engalla’s death
meant that Kaiser faced only a single general damage
claim limited to $250,000 instead of separate claims of
the patient (now deceased) and his spouse amounting to
a total of $500,000.
In 1992, the Engallas broke off the arbitration process
and filed a complaint in court alleging fraud as a defense
to enforcement of the arbitration agreement and pursuing
the underlying malpractice claim as well. Kaiser’s attor-
neys then removed the case to federal court, claiming that
the action and all issues presented were subject to federal
preemption under ERISA and proposed continuing the
arbitration process. The Engallas declined the offer and
filed a motion to remand the case to state court, which the
federal court granted.
According the California Supreme Court,
the system-wide nature of Kaiser’s delay comes into
clearer focus when it is contrasted with other arbitra-
tion systems. As the Engallas point out, many large
institutional users of arbitration, including most health
maintenance organizations (HMOs), avoid the poten-
tial problems of delay in the selection of arbitrators by
contracting with neutral third party organizations,
such as the American Arbitration Association (AAA).
To what degree Kaiser was responsible for delays that
occurred in its arbitration program on a system-wide basis
remains a matter of contention. Some point out that delays
in many other cases may just as well have been the result
of tactics by plaintiffs’ lawyers, who, like defendants’
lawyers, often seek to control the speed of a process and
may attempt to slow it down to their client’s advantage. It
has been asserted, too, that lawyers paid on an hourly
basis generally may have an incentive to string out
disputes in order to increase their billings. However,
attorneys representing plaintiffs in medical malpractice
cases nearly always are paid on a contingency basis and
thus have no financial incentive to delay since the amount
they will be paid will be the same whenever a matter is
resolved. Attorneys representing defendants, such as
HMOs, are more likely to be paid hourly. HMOs can
avoid the incentive to delay when they use outside
counsel if they pay on a fixed price per claim basis.
The Employer as Agent
The California Supreme Court noted that, as a
member of an employee benefit plan, Engalla had little
if any cognizance of the arbitration agreement between
his employer and Kaiser. Despite this, the court noted
that it was reasonable to presume that an employer
negotiating or selecting a group health plan on behalf of
its employees is acting on their interest. “If that proves
not to be the case, then an employee bound by an
arbitration agreement of which he was scarcely aware
could well raise a claim that such an agreement was
unconscionable,” the state supreme court said.
KAISER’S EFFORTS TO IMPROVE ITS
ARBITRATION SYSTEM
Advisory Panel Recommendations
In the wake of the California Supreme Court deci-
sion on the Engalla case, David Lawrence, M.D.,
Kaiser’s chairman and chief executive officer, assem-
bled an independent panel to advise him on how to
improve the company’s system of medical malpractice
arbitration. In 1998, the panel made several recommen-
dations, including the following:30
 An independent administrator should supervise the
arbitration system.
 The arbitration process should be expedited, effi-
cient, and fair.
 Methods should be developed to audit and monitor
the progress of the independent administrator and to
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research and evaluate the fairness and effectiveness
of the arbitration system.
 An ombudsperson program should be instituted to
assist members in navigating the system.
The Kaiser Permanente arbitration system is used for
a variety of disputes between patients, family members,
and the Kaiser system, the panel reported. From 1992 to
September 1997, a total of 5,313 demands for arbitration
were filed. (Note that, although the number of demands
for arbitration ran into the thousands over a multiyear
period, only a tiny fraction of Kaiser’s membership filed
such actions in any given year. For example, about two
hundredths of a percent of Kaiser members filed such a
demand in 1996.) While about 90 percent of Kaiser’s
arbitration cases concerned malpractice claims, the
arbitration system was also used for premises liability and
coverage disputes, the panel found. In response to a
concern expressed by some that the arbitration system
might face an increasing number of cases concerning
benefits or coverage issues, the panel said it was unable to
address that question for lack of evidence but also sug-
gested that “the unique characteristics of coverage or
benefit cases may demand a far more speedy system than
one designed for medical malpractice—though all
arbitration should be speedy in our view.”
The panel noted that before an individual files a
demand for arbitration concerning issues of coverage,
there is a formal and informal dispute resolution system
within the HMO system but found evidence that the
system was difficult to navigate for members. In at-
tempting to summarize Kaiser’s internal dispute resolu-
tion process, the panel noted, “In spite of what would
appear to be a good faith attempt to explain the system,
and provide printed information to members, we were
left with no clear view of the process.”
Just as the panel strongly believed that Kaiser must
honor its representation that its imposed binding arbitra-
tion system is fair, reasonable, and just, employers who
contract with the HMO also “have an obligation to see
that the medical malpractice arbitration system is fair to
their employees,” the panel emphasized.
New Independent Administrator and
Speedier Process
In October 1998 Kaiser selected the Law Offices of
Sharon Lybeck Hartmann to act as independent admin-
istrator of Kaiser’s mandatory arbitration system for
plan members in California. Under the contract, Hart-
mann’s office is to write rules of procedure for Kaiser
arbitrations, create a pool of qualified neutral arbitrators
to hear cases, and to independently administer arbitra-
tion cases brought by Kaiser members. According to the
new independent administrator’s first annual report, the
process had speeded up dramatically.31 During the
program’s first year, claims averaged 43 days to ap-
pointment of a neutral arbitrator (as contrasted to the
674 days cited by the court in the Engalla case) and
hearings ended in an average of 213 days (as contrasted
to the old average of 863 days to begin hearings cited
by the court). The independent administrator reported
that 323 neutrals had been appointed to its panel, 27
percent of whom were retired judges. Of the total, 166
had been named as the neutral arbitrator in at least one
case in the program’s first year of operation.
Under the new system’s operating rules, most cases
must be completed within 18 months. So far, 168 of the
681 cases administered under the program have been
resolved. A total of 73 (11 percent) of the 681 cases have
been settled while 49 people withdrew their claims.
Neutral arbitrators have dismissed four cases and five
have been deemed abandoned due to a claimant’s failure
to pay the filing fee. Kaiser resolved one case before a
neutral arbitrator was appointed. Summary judgment in
Kaiser’s favor was granted in 14 cases. A total of 22 cases
have proceeded through a full hearing to an award.
Judgment was for Kaiser in 17 cases (or 77 percent) while
claimants prevailed in five cases (23 percent).
Of the 681 cases received by the independent
administrator, 641 (94 percent) were medical malprac-
tice cases, 3 involved benefits disputes, 9 involved
premises liability, 2 involved other torts, and 26 were
characterized as “unknown.” The independent adminis-
trator reported that the results of cases in Kaiser’s new
system appear to be consistent with results in the courts,
at least as reported from two sources. For the purposes
of comparison, the administrator reviewed the Califor-
nia medical malpractice cases reported to the Los
Angeles Daily Journal’s Verdicts and Settlements over
the previous 12 months and found that 75 of the 168
court cases reported to the periodical resulted in defense
verdicts, while 27 resulted in plaintiffs’ verdicts and 66
cases were settled. Of the 102 cases in which courts
reached verdicts, the defense prevailed in 74 percent
and plaintiffs won in 26 percent. Drawing from data
compiled by the Bureau of Justice Statistics reporting
on 1996 trial results in the 75 largest counties in the
nation, the independent administrator noted that out of
1,201 medical malpractice cases, 272 (23 percent)
resulted in verdicts in favor of plaintiffs.
The cost of paying arbitrators can pose a barrier to
individuals seeking arbitration of a claim. The advisory
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panel concluded that the party arbitrators routinely used
in Kaiser’s former arbitration process increased costs and
caused more delays than would have occurred by using
only a single neutral arbitrator. Therefore, the independ-
ent administrator encourages parties to use a single
arbitrator to decide cases. Now, if the demand for arbitra-
tion seeks total damages of $200,000 or less, disputes are
heard by one neutral arbitrator and Kaiser will pay for the
neutral arbitrator’s fees and expenses if a claimant agrees
to waive any potential objection arising out of such
payment. The HMO also will cover the neutral arbitra-
tor’s fees and expenses if demands for arbitration seek
total damages exceeding $200,000 in cases where the
claimant agrees to waive the right to a party arbitrator.
CALIFORNIA LEGISLATION
In California, controversy over the use of binding
arbitration as a condition of coverage in HMO contracts
led to the introduction of legislation (Assembly Bill
1751) that would prohibit “a health care service plan,
application, or contract . . . from requiring binding
arbitration to resolve disputes under the contract.”
However, the bill’s sponsor, Assemblywoman Sheila
James Kuehl (D) moved to withdraw the bill after it
became apparent that it lacked enough support to pass.
Another bill (Senate Bill 1934) introduced in the
California legislature32 would further regulate the use of
binding arbitration by health care service plans. Among
this bill’s stipulations are the following:
 Plan contracts shall not impose limits on damages
that may be awarded in arbitration that differ from
damages that could be otherwise awarded in a
similar dispute by a court or jury trial.
 Enrollees or subscribers shall not be prohibited from
being represented by counsel.
 Enrollees or subscribers shall not be prohibited from
filing a written brief or making a closing argument
before the arbitrator.
 Plan contracts shall provide that the same statute of
limitations governing the timeliness of civil actions
shall also govern the timeliness of a demand for
arbitration.
 A court may vacate an arbitrator’s award where
there is evidence of manifest disregard for the law
resulting in a substantial injustice.
Using the Supreme Court’s logic in Doctor’s Associ-
ates, Inc. v. Casarotto, both of the California bills might
be preempted by the FAA because they appear to place
regulatory limits on the use of arbitration not applied to
contracts generally. In 1999, for example, a California
court of appeal cited Casarotto in finding that, although
an Aetna Healths Plans of California, Inc., binding
arbitration provision failed to comply with a state health
and safety law setting out disclosure requirements, that
statute was preempted by the FAA.33 (In this case, a
Medicare beneficiary who had enrolled in a managed care
plan claimed that the plan’s delay in covering a particular
treatment for prostate cancer constituted a breach of
contract and breach of good faith and also constituted
negligence, negligent misrepresentation, infliction of
emotional distress, and fraud. Aetna moved to compel
arbitration based on a provision in its “Senior Choice”
handbook requiring binding arbitration to settle disputes
except those subject to Medicare’s appeals procedure.
Besides finding that the arbitration clause in question
violated California law, the lower court also found that the
arbitration clause was not sufficiently clear and unequivo-
cal to be valid under state law. The appeals court reversed
the judgment and granted Aetna’s motion for arbitration.)
ADR PROTOCOL FOR HEALTH CARE
In 1997, the leading associations involved in ADR,
law, and medicine formed a commission that made
recommendations on how ADR methods such as
arbitration and mediation should be employed in the
health field. Appointed by the AAA, the American Bar
Association (ABA), and the American Medical Associ-
ation (AMA), the Commission on Health Care Dispute
Resolution34 issued recommendations in 1998, in part to
provide guidance to MCOs considering adopting ADR
programs as well as legislative and regulatory bodies
considering the establishment of standards governing
the use of ADR in the health environment.
Excluding disputes concerning malpractice from its
scope of study, the commission unanimously recom-
mended that ADR systems can and should be used to
resolve disputes over health care coverage and access
arising out of the relationship between private health
plans (such as MCOs) and either patients or health care
providers.35 However, the commission made an impor-
tant qualification: “In disputes involving patients,
binding forms of dispute resolution should be used only
where the parties agree to do so after a dispute arises”
[emphasis added]. It should be noted, however, that a
senior executive of the AAA interviewed by the author
of this paper said that the AAA does not interpret this
recommendation made by the commission to apply to
binding arbitration clauses inserted in HMO contracts
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before disputes arise. Furthermore, as the leading
administrator of ADR services, the AAA administers
arbitration programs for HMOs to settle disputes arising
under HMO contracts with consumers that establish
binding arbitration before disputes arise.
The dispute resolution commission also recommended
that due process protections should be afforded to all
participants in ADR processes. Finally, it recommended
that ADR should complement the concept of internal
review of determinations made by private MCOs.
When the question arose whether ADR as a form of
external review of health plan determinations might be
precluded by ERISA, the commission concluded that
ERISA does not preclude parties from voluntarily
adopting the use of ADR, even binding arbitration, but
added that legislative clarification would be helpful to
avoid confusion or concern over the appropriate use of
ADR methods.
ARBITRATION UNDER FEDERAL
PATIENT PROTECTION PROPOSALS
Legislation
The patient protection bills passed by the U.S. House
and Senate in 1999 make no mention of binding arbitra-
tion, including whether it should be allowed to substitute
for new internal or external review requirements that they
contain. Neither bill would create a new federal cause of
action to expand ERISA health plan participants’ right to
sue their health plans. The House bill, however, would
strip back ERISA preemption to allow patients greater
latitude to sue under state law. Neither bill addresses
whether, or under what conditions, binding arbitration
might be substituted for court remedies. After congressio-
nal conferees grappled for several months over how to
resolve differences between the two bills, the Senate on
June 29 passed a measure that would amend ERISA to
allow injured health plan participants and beneficiaries to
sue “designated decision-makers” for economic and
noneconomic damages caused by their failing to follow an
independent medical reviewer’s decision reversing a
benefit denial. The legislation also would allow similar
lawsuits to proceed against “designated decision-makers”
that acted in bad faith in delaying the provision of benefits
approved by an independent medical reviewer. This bill
also does not mention arbitration.
Proposed Rules
The Labor Department has issued a proposed
regulation establishing new standards for how employee
benefit plans, including health plans, review coverage
denials internally. The proposed regulation would end
the special exception that currently allows single-
employer collectively bargained plans to substitute an
arbitration process for elements of the Section 503
claims appeals rules. The proposed regulations would
be overridden by any of the patient protection bills
currently before Congress. The proposed regulations
state that a plan’s benefit claims procedures may not
include more than one level of mandatory appeal (many
managed care organizations now require several levels
of appeal) and that plans are precluded from requiring
claimants to submit to binding arbitration as part of that
single level of appeal or subsequently.36 The Labor
Department said that one of its major concerns in
proposing the new rules was to prevent unnecessary
delays in resolving claims disputes. The proposed rule
states,
The Department considers it essential that claimants
be free to decide, after having completed the mini-
mum number of administrative appeals necessary to
allow for a full and fair review of the claim, whether
to continue to pursue a claim through the plan’s
additional procedures, if any, or to file suit under
section 502(a) of the Act.
The proposed regulations amplify the provision in
the current rules prohibiting the use of procedures that
“unduly inhibit or hamper” the initiation or processing
of plan claims. Any provision or practice requiring
claimants to pay a fee or costs in order to make or
appeal a claim would be considered unduly inhibiting.37
CONCLUSION
Measures now being considered by Congress to
bolster the appeal rights and expand the court remedies
available to people contesting health benefit denials
may expand potential liability faced by plan sponsors,
health insurers, and MCOs. As this liability grows, so
might the attractiveness of alternatives to going to court,
including binding arbitration. Binding arbitration is
currently used to resolve disputes between individuals
and health plans in many types of cases, including
disputes over coverage under ERISA. The use of
binding arbitration presents a series of policy issues that
have yet to be settled, especially with regard to disputes
over coverage in which a patient’s life or health may
rest upon an arbitrator’s decision and the process
leading up to it. Among the many questions facing
health policymakers are (a) when arbitration processes
are appropriate to use, (b) how procedural fairness can
be maintained, and (c) how an appropriate balance of
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power can be maintained between individuals and
institutions at all stages of the arbitration process.
Issues Raised
Among the issues raised by the use of binding
arbitration to resolve health coverage disputes and other
matters affecting patients are the following:
 Are binding arbitration processes operated by
business organizations, such as managed care plans,
fair and impartial? How might they be monitored to
ensure procedural fairness?
 Should binding arbitration be allowed to resolve
disputes involving patients or members of health
plans? If so, under what conditions?
 When individuals purchase their own health insur-
ance, is it appropriate for a health insurer to require
them to agree to binding arbitration of disputes that
might arise later, such as those over coverage issues
or involving claims of medical malpractice? If so,
how should such agreements be presented to indi-
viduals? Should an individual purchaser have the
option not to waive legal remedies that otherwise
would be available? Should insurers be allowed to
offer discounted premiums to encourage consumers
to sign predispute arbitration agreements?
 Should binding arbitration agreements between
patients and health plans (or health services provid-
ers) be allowed before a dispute arises and the
nature of the dispute is known?
 With regard to employee health plans, including those
governed by ERISA, to what degree can binding
arbitration agreements displace administrative appeal
options (statutorily mandated internal and external
review of coverage decisions, for example) and
subsequent legal remedies? Should individual em-
ployees (and not just plan sponsors ostensibly bargain-
ing on their behalf) be required to sign binding arbitra-
tion agreements for them to be enforceable? Should
employers or unions sponsoring health coverage be
allowed to sign away plan participants’ statutory
remedies for resolving coverage disputes, especially
given that some of those disputes may arise between
fiduciaries appointed by the sponsor and the partici-
pant over interpretation of what is a covered benefit?
 Are employee health benefit plans adhesion con-
tracts (contracts allowing individual plan partici-
pants little or no room for negotiating their terms)?
If so, what is the implication for the use of arbitra-
tion clauses inserted by plan sponsors?
 As a matter of public policy, which types of admin-
istrative appeals and court remedies could be waived
in favor of an alternative method of dispute resolu-
tion such as binding arbitration? Which could not
be? If binding arbitration of coverage disputes
continues to be allowed, when should the process
kick in?
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